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Abstract:
The fact that modern Networked Industrial Control Systems (NICS) depend on In-
formation and Communication Technologies (ICT), is well known. Although many
studies have focused on the security of SCADA systems, today we still lack the proper
understanding of the eﬀects that cyber attacks have on NICS. In this paper we iden-
tify the communication and control logic implementation parameters that inﬂuence
the outcome of attacks against NICS and that could be used as eﬀective measures
for increasing the resilience of industrial installations. The implemented scenario in-
volves a powerful attacker that is able to send legitimate Modbus packets/commands
to control hardware in order to bring the physical process into a critical state, i.e.
dangerous, or more generally unwanted state of the system. The analysis uses a Boil-
ing Water Power Plant to show that the outcome of cyber attacks is inﬂuenced by
network delays, packet losses, background traﬃc and control logic scheduling time.
The main goal of this paper is to start an exploration of cyber-physical eﬀects in par-
ticular scenarios. This study is the ﬁrst of its kind to analyze cyber-physical systems
and provides insight to the way that the cyber realm aﬀects the physical realm.
Keywords: cyber attacks, Industrial Control Systems, SCADA, security.
1 Introduction
Modern Critical Infrastructures (CI), e.g. power plants, water plants and smart grids, rely on
Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) for their operation since ICT can lead to
cost optimization as well as greater eﬃciency, ﬂexibility and interoperability between components.
In the past CIs were isolated environments and used proprietary hardware and protocols, limiting
thus the threats that could aﬀect them. Nowadays CIs, or more speciﬁcally Networked Industrial
Control Systems (NICS), are exposed to signiﬁcant cyber-threats; a fact that has been highlighted
by many studies on the security of Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems
[1, 2].
The recently reported Stuxnet worm [3] is the ﬁrst malware speciﬁcally designed to attack
NICS. Its ability to reprogram the logic of control hardware in order to alter physical processes
demonstrated how powerful such threats can be. Stuxnet was a concrete proof of a successful
cyber-physical attack but by no means a trivial attack. It required a thorough knowledge of the
physical system, software and OS vulnerabilities. In this paper we consider an adversary with
a lower level of sophistication that instead of reprogramming the highly specialized hardware
(PLCs) as in the Stuxnet case, he exploits the ability of control hardware to communicate with
remote stations using well-established protocols such as TCP, that are normally used by the
operator to read sensor values, e.g. pressure, temperature, and control actuators, e.g. valves.
Furthermore, we identify the communication and control logic implementation parameters that
inﬂuence the outcome of cyber attacks against NICS and that could be used as eﬀective measures
for increasing the resilience of industrial installations. In our study the attacker is located
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outside the plant, somewhere in the Internet, from where he/she exploits the capability of control
hardware to communicate with remote stations. Although direct connections between control
hardware and the Internet are usually avoided in NICS implementations [5], the attacker might
install a malware on a station with an Internet connection located within the corporate network
that could be used to forward messages to the control hardware. We consider that the control
hardware is running legitimate code designed to keep the physical process in a normal operating
point, while the attacker tries to bring it to a critical state, i.e. dangerous, or more generally
unwanted state of the system [6]. The method employed by the attacker is a repeated transmission
of commands to the control hardware that open/close speciﬁc valves. The main contribution of
this paper is that it is the ﬁrst of its kind to analyze cyber-physical systems and provides insight
to the way that the cyber realm aﬀects the physical realm.
The real applicability of the implemented scenario is conﬁrmed not only by Stuxnet, but
by other past events as well. One example in this sense is a 2002 penetration test done by a
security ﬁrm for a power company located in California. The testers parked their van outside
a remote substation, where they noticed a wireless antenna. Without leaving their vehicle they
managed to connect to the system and within 20 minutes they have not only mapped the entire
network, but also ”they were talking to the business network and had pulled oﬀ several business
reports” [4]. By taking these events and adapting them to our scenario we can further imagine
that the testers are in fact attackers that install a remotely accessible gateway and launch their
attack from the anonymity provided by the Internet.
The attack scenario has been implemented with the help of our previously developed frame-
work [7] that uses simulation for the physical components and an emulation testbed based on
Emulab [8, 9] to recreate the cyber part of NICS, e.g., SCADA servers, corporate network, etc.
In the implemented scenario we have used the model of a Boiling Water Power Plant developed
by Bell and Åström [10].
The paper is structured as follows. After an analysis of related work in Section 2 we present a
brief overview of the experimentation framework in Section 3. The methodology and implemented
experiments are presented in Section 4 and 5, respectively. The paper concludes in Section 6.
2 Related Work
An approach where real sensors and actuators, combined with simulated PLCs and communi-
cation protocols were used to study cyber-physical systems has been proposed by Queiroz, et
al. [15]. Their study showed that while PLCs are under a DoS attack, operators might take
delayed or wrong decisions that could disrupt the operation of the plant. A similar experiment
has also been documented by Davis, et al. [16] that used the PowerWorld server to study the
eﬀects of communication delays between the physical process and human operators. In the same
direction, the work of Chabukswar, et al. [17] proved that a DDoS attack against communication
nodes between controllers and sensors causes the PLCs to take wrong decisions based on old
sensor values. Cárdenas, et al. [18], went further by not only documenting the eﬀects of DoS
attacks on sensors, but also proposing a new detection mechanism and possible countermeasures.
The previously mentioned approaches have demonstrated the eﬀectiveness of DoS attacks,
but without reaching a sophistication level that would have allowed the attacker to reprogram
the low level control logic of the PLCs. This fact sets an important barrier in terms of knowledge,
skills and eﬀorts required by the attacker, as was the case of Stuxnet, where developers had also
knowledge of the PLC code, OS and hardware details. In this category we ﬁnd the work of Nai
Fovino, et al. [5] that have proposed an experimental platform for studying the eﬀects of cyber
attacks against NICS. In their paper the authors describe several attack scenarios, including
DoS attacks and worm infections that send Modbus packets to control hardware. Although the
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authors provide a wide set of countermeasures, they do not identify communication parame-
ters that aﬀect the outcome of the attacks. Moreover, in our analysis we have also identiﬁed
installation-speciﬁc parameters that can directly aﬀect the resilience of physical processes.
3 Framework Overview
After providing a brief description of a typical NICS architecture, this section presents a short
overview of our previously developed experimentation framework used in our experiments.
3.1 Process Control Architecture Overview
In modern NICS architectures, one can identify two diﬀerent control layers: (i) the physical layer
composed of all the actuators, sensors, and generally speaking hardware devices that physically
perform the actions on the system, e.g. open a valve, measure the voltage in a cable; (ii) the
cyber layer composed of all the ICT devices and software which acquire the data, elaborate low
level process strategies and deliver the commands to the physical layer. The cyber layer typically
uses SCADA protocols to control and manage the physical devices within the cyber layer. The
”distributed control system” of the cyber layer is typically split among two networks: the control
network and the process network. The process network usually hosts all the SCADA (also known
as SCADA Masters) and HMI (Human Machine Interface) servers. The control network hosts all
the devices which, on the one side control the actuators and sensors of the physical layer and on
the other side provide the ”control interface” to the process network. A typical control network
is composed of a mesh of PLCs (Programmable Logic Controller). From an operational point of
view, PLCs receive data from the physical layer, elaborate a ”local actuation strategy”, and send
back commands to the actuators. PLCs execute also the commands that they receive from the
SCADA servers (Masters) and additionally provide, whenever requested, detailed physical layer
data.
3.2 Framework Architecture
The previously developed framework [7] follows a hybrid approach, where the Emulab-based
testbed recreates the control and process network of NICS, including PLCs and SCADA servers,
and a software simulation reproduces the physical processes. The architecture, as shown in
Figure 1, clearly distinguishes 3 layers: the cyber layer, the physical layer and a link layer in
between. The cyber layer includes regular ICT components used in SCADA systems, while the
physical layer provides the simulation of physical devices. The link layer, i.e. cyber-physical
layer, provides the ”glue” between the two layers through the use of a shared memory region.
The physical layer is recreated through a soft real-time simulator that runs within the SC
(Simulation Core) unit and executes a model of the physical system. The simulator’s execution
time is strongly coupled to the timing service of the underlying operating system (OS). Through-
out the paper the term time step is used to denote the time between two successive executions of
the physical model in the simulator. The cyber layer is recreated by an emulation testbed that
uses the Emulab architecture and software [8,9] to automatically and dynamically map physical
components, e.g. servers, switches to a virtual topology. Besides the process network, the cyber
layer also includes the control logic code that in the real world is run by PLCs. The control
code can be run sequentially or in parallel to the physical model. In the sequential case, a tightly
coupled code (TCC) is used, i.e. code that is running in the same memory space with the model,
within the SC unit. In the parallel case a loosely coupled code (LCC) is used, i.e. code that
is running in another address space, possibly on another host, within the R-PLC unit (Remote
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Figure 1: Experimentation framework architectural overview
PLC). The unit that implements global decision algorithms based on the sensor values received
from the R-PLC units is also present in the proposed framework as the Master unit. The cyber-
physical layer incorporates the PLC memory, seen as a set of registers typical of PLCs, and the
communication interfaces that ”glue” together the other two layers. Prototypes of SC, R-PLC
and Master Units have been developed in C# (Windows) and have been ported and tested on
Unix-based systems (FreeBSD, Fedora and Ubuntu) with the use of the Mono platform. Matlab
Simulink was used as the physical process simulator (physical layer). From Simulink models the
corresponding ’C’ code is generated using Matlab RTW. The communication between SC and
R-PLC units is handled by .NET’s binary implementation of RPC (called remoting) over TCP.
For the communication between the R-PLC and Master units, we used the Modbus over TCP
protocol.
4 Methodology
In this section we provide a description of the methodology we used, including a description of
the scenario and experimental setup.
4.1 Scenario
Previous security events [3, 4] involving NICS showed that attackers can (easily) compromise
stations located within an installation’s internal network. These stations can then be used as
gateways for downloading malicious code and for remotely controlling other stations, including
control hardware such as PLCs. The implemented scenario assumes that there is already a
compromised station providing access to PLCs. This is used by the attacker to send remote
Modbus commands in order to bring the physical process into a critical state.
The physical process used in our experiments is the Boiling Water Power Plant (BWPP)
model developed by Bell and Åström [10]. Within this context the critical state is given by an
increased steam pressure that is more than twice the value of a typical operating point. Although
to the best of our knowledge the literature does not mention anything about the consequences of
running the process with these parameters, we assumed that this might cause physical damages
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and therefore could become a desired target for the attacker. Furthermore, we assumed that the
attack is conducted for a limited time period of 10 minutes, as immediately after it is started
the process experiences signiﬁcant deviations from its normal operating point. Consequently,
alarms might be turned ON and human operators might intervene by switching OFF devices or
disconnecting equipment. As shown later in this paper, the 10 minute time period is more than
enough for the attacker to bring the physical process into a critical state.
Our experimental results presented in the next section show that the outcome of the attack
is aﬀected not only by network delays, packet losses and background traﬃc, but also by the
execution of PLC control code and the speed of control valves. These can be used as eﬀective
measures to increase the resilience of physical processes confronted with cyber attacks.
4.2 Experimental Setup
The previously described scenario has been implemented in the Joint Research Centre’s (JRC)
Experimental Platform for Internet Contingencies (EPIC) laboratory. The Emulab testbed in-
cluded nodes with the following conﬁguration: FreeBSD OS 8, AMD Athlon Dual Core CPU
at 2.3GHz and 4GB of RAM. We have emulated network delays, packet losses and background
traﬃc with the Dummynet [11, 12] and iperf [13] software in order to recreate a dynamic and
unpredictable environment such as the Internet.
As shown in Figure 2, the experimental setup consisted of 6 hosts: 1 host for running the SC
unit, 3 hosts for running the R-PLC units, 1 host for running the Compromised Station and 1
host for the attacker. The attacker uses the Compromised Station to forward Modbus packets
to R-PLC units and ﬁnally to write the PLC memory within the SC unit. The control code
that is in charge of maintaining the BWPP at a constant operating point has been implemented
as TCC code, where TCC1 controls the fuel valve, TCC2 controls the steam valve and TCC3
controls the feed-water valve. The role of the R-PLC units is simply to enable access to the
physical model using the Modbus/TCP protocol. Although R-PLC units can also run control
code, the decision to implement control code as TCCs has been made based on the granularity
of the process model execution step that needs to be less than 1ms. This is needed in order to
emulate PLC tasks that can be scheduled to run within milliseconds. Consequently, the chosen
time step for the physical model was of 0.5ms.
Network delays, background traﬃc and packet losses, speciﬁc to a dynamic environment
such as the Internet, have been emulated between the attacker’s station and the Compromised
Station. The limited bandwidth and communication capabilities of PLCs have been emulated
with 10Mbit/s Lans (Lan2 and Lan1, respectively), while using a 100Mbit/s Lan (Lan0 ) between
R-PLCs and the SC unit in order to maximize the performance of the interaction between R-PLC
units and the BWPP model.
4.3 Boiling Water Power Plant
As already mentioned, in this paper we use the Boiling Water Power Plant (BWPP) model
developed by Bell and Åström in [10]. It models a 160MW oil-ﬁred electric power plant based
on the Sydsvenska Kraft AB plant in Malmö, Sweden. The operation of the process is controlled
by three valves, i.e. fuel valve, steam valve and feed-water valve, while the operator is able
to monitor the process by reading three sensors: steam pressure, water level and generated
electricity. The following equations describe the dynamics of the physical process [10]:
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Figure 2: Experimental setup
_x1 =  0:0018u2x9=81 + 0:9u1   0:15u3;
_x2 = (0:073u2   0:016)x9=81   0:1x2;
_x3 = (141u3   (1:1u2   0:19)x1)=85;
y1 = x1;
y2 = x2;
y3 = 0:05(0:1307x3 + 100sq + er=9  67:975);
sq =
(1 0:001538x3)(0:8x1 25:6)
x3(1:0394 0:0012304x1) ;
er = (0:85u2   0:147)x1 + 45:59u1   2:514u3   2:096;
0  ui  1(i = 1; 2; 3);
_u1  0:007=sec; 1:0  _u2  0:1=sec; _u3  0:05=sec;
(1)
where x1; x2 and x3 denote the steam pressure (kg/cm2), electric output (MW), and ﬂuid density
(kg/m3), respectively; y1; y2 and y3 denote the outputs of the model, where y3 is the water level
deviation (m); u1; u2 and u3 are the valve positions for fuel ﬂow, steam ﬂow and feed-water ﬂow,
respectively; sq and er denote the steam quality and evaporation rate (kg/s), respectively.
In our experiments we used a normal operating point for the BWPP in which the pressure
equals 108 kg/cm2, that was achieved by keeping the three valves in the following normal valve
positions (NVP): u1 = 0:34, u2 = 0:69 and u3 = 0:433 [14]. As a consequence, TCCs, that
implement the control logic code, must maintain constant the position of the three valves in
order to provide a constant steam pressure of 108 kg/cm2. For the critical state we consider a
pressure of 250 kg/cm2 that is more than twice the value of the steam pressure of the process
running in the previously mentioned normal operating point. The attacker is able to bring the
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BWPP into the critical state by continuously sending Modbus packets (around 100/sec for each
valve) that keep the steam and feed-water valves in the CLOSED position (u2 = 0 and u3 = 0,
respectively) and the fuel valve in the OPENED position (u1 = 1). Throughout this paper we
use the term attacker’s valve positions (AVP) to denote the position of the three valves in the
attacker’s setting.
5 Attacks and Analysis
In this section we analyze the inﬂuence of several parameters on the cyber attacks launched
remotely from the Internet, as described in the scenario from the previous section. The analysis
is conducted in two phases: in the ﬁrst phase we analyze the ability of the attacker to maintain the
control valves in the AVP; in the second phase we analyze the ability of the attacker to increase
the steam pressure to 250 kg/cm2, thus actually bringing the plant into the critical state. While
the goal of the second phase is clear, the goal of the ﬁrst one needs further explanation. The
actual goal of the ﬁrst phase is to analyze the reaction of PLCs in terms of commands sent to
the valves, reaction that might provide assistance in the rationale of the results in the second
phase. In both phases we have measured the inﬂuence of: PLC task scheduling (TS) every 100ms
and 1ms; network delays of 0s, 0.5s and 3s; packet losses of 1%, 5% and 10%; and background
traﬃc of 2.5Mbit/s, 5Mbit/s and 10Mbit/s. Such extreme values for network delays, i.e. 3s, and
packet losses, i.e. 10%, can rarely be measured over the Internet (possibly over satellite links or
multiple intermediate proxies). Nevertheless, we have included them in our analysis in order to
justify our statements related to the required magnitude of these parameters for inﬂuencing the
outcome of the attack. For each conﬁguration setting, representing a combination of PLC TS,
network delays, packet losses and background traﬃc we have run one experiment for 10 minutes.
In total, we have run 540 experiments in 9 hours.
5.1 The Eﬀect of the Cyber Attack on the Position of Control Valves
The implementation of Modbus over TCP allows attackers to remotely control the three valves,
i.e. fuel valve, steam valve, feed-water valve, thus providing a certain anonymity to the attacker.
Nevertheless, this status is compensated by ﬂuctuating parameters such as network delays, packet
losses and background traﬃc that can have a major eﬀect on the outcome of the attack. In this
sub-section we analyze the eﬀects of these parameters and two diﬀerent TS, i.e. 100ms and 1ms,
on the position of the three control valves.
100ms Task Scheduling
The eﬀect of network delays on the position of control valves for a 100ms TS time is given in
Figure 3. Each sub-ﬁgure shows the position of a speciﬁc control valve during the 10 minute
attack, starting with the NVP shown at t = 0 minutes and following with the changes induced by
the attacker that, as shown by most of the ﬁgures, bring the valves into the AVP. The diﬀerences
we observe in the behavior of the three valves are caused by the motion speed of each valve that
is diﬀerent in each case (Equation 1). Thus, the fastest to open and close is the steam valve
(0.1/sec for opening and 1/sec for closing) followed by the feed-water valve (0.05/sec) and by
the fuel valve (0.007/sec). Consequently, the greater the speed, the higher the ﬂuctuations that
we see in Figure 3 and the higher the ability of PLCs to maintain the NVP.
One of the main conclusions from our results (Figure 3) is that network delays are beneﬁcial
to the physical process when confronted with cyber attacks. Nevertheless, the attacker is able to
bring the valves into the AVP even for network delays of 3s. The attacker is most successful with
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Figure 3: Eﬀect of network delays on control valve positions for 100ms TS, 1% loss rate and
2.5Mbit/s background traﬃc
the fuel valve as this has the lowest speed and the control code is running only once every 100ms,
while the attacker sends one Modbus command every 10ms, i.e. 100/sec. For the other two valves
the PLCs are able to produce a slight deviation from the AVP; however, these are unable to bring
the valves back to the NVP. As we increase the network delays we notice that PLCs are causing
larger deviations from the AVP and in the extreme case of 3s the attacker is able to produce only
small deviations from the NVP for the fuel and feed-water valves. Nevertheless, the attacker is
still able to close the steam valve, as its closing speed (1/sec) exceeds 10 times its opening speed
(0.1/sec). Based on these results we can conclude that only extreme network delays, e.g. 3s,
have a major inﬂuence on the outcome of the attack. In addition, an attacker could successfully
exploit a diﬀerent opening and closing speed of valves, that could be interpreted as a slower
reaction of the PLCs.
Going further, in Figure 4 we show the eﬀect of packet losses on the position of the valves
for the same TS of 100ms. By increasing the packet loss from 1% (Figure 3) to 5% and 10%
(Figure 4) we also increase the deviations from AVP. Nevertheless, even with higher packet losses
PLCs are unable to maintain the NVP, not even in the case of slower valves such as the fuel and
feed-water valves. As shown in the same ﬁgure, we have also experimented with extreme packet
losses of 10%. However, as the attacker uses a 10 times higher packet rate than the control code
scheduling rate, even in this case PLCs are unable to keep the valves in the NVP.
We have also investigated the eﬀect of background traﬃc on the three valves, shown in Figure
5. By increasing the background traﬃc from 2.5Mbit/s (Figure 3) to 5Mbit/s (Figure 5) we do
not notice major eﬀects, as the maximum network capacity is 10Mbit/s and the 100 Modbus
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Figure 4: Eﬀect of packet loss on plant valve positions for 100ms TS, 0s emulated delay and
2.5Mbit/s background traﬃc
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Figure 5: Eﬀect of background traﬃc on plant valve positions for 100ms TS, 0s emulated delay
and 1% packet loss
messages sent every second for each valve generate a traﬃc of around 140Kbit/s, with a total
of 420Kbit/s for all three valves. Nevertheless, when the background traﬃc reaches the network
capacity fewer messages reach the PLCs which are able to maintain the NVP with only small
deviations. However, even in this later extreme case the steam valve is aﬀected by the attacker,
as its closing speed is 10 times higher than its opening speed, and counteracting one single packet
received from the attacker requires 10 executions of the control code.
1ms Task Scheduling
The previous results have shown that if PLCs have a control code TS of 100ms they are not
eﬀective in maintaining the NVP. Moreover, the outcome of the attack is aﬀected only by extreme
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Figure 6: Eﬀect of network delays on plant valve positions for 1ms TS, 1% loss rate and 2.5Mbit/s
background traﬃc
cases of network delays and background traﬃc. For this reason we have also experimented with
a TS of 1ms that could signiﬁcantly improve the reaction of the PLCs.
For a TS of 1ms, even in the case of 0s emulated delay, the attacker is only able to produce
insigniﬁcant deviations from NVP for fuel and feed-water valves, as shown in Figure 6. Never-
theless, the steam valve is still aﬀected by the attack and the attacker is able to bring it to the
AVP. However, in this case larger network delays show a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the steam valve, as
the attacker is unable to maintain the steam valve in the AVP for delays larger than 3s.
As the fuel and feed-water valves present only insigniﬁcant changes already shown in Figure 6,
we further focus our attention on the steam valve. We have repeated the experiments for diﬀerent
packet losses and background traﬃc, with the results shown in Figure 7. As in the case of the
previous results, larger packet losses do not improve the response of the PLCs. Nevertheless, the
extreme case of 10Mbit/s for background traﬃc ensures small deviations from the NVP for the
ﬁrst 5 minutes of the experiment. In the second half more packets reach the PLC that produce
larger and larger deviations and ﬁnally after 8 minutes are able to bring the valve into the AVP.
The results from this sub-section have shown that the attacker is able to aﬀect the NVP
for all three valves if the PLCs use a TS of 100ms. Within this setting network delays and
background traﬃc are major factors that inﬂuence the attack, as also illustrated in Table 1.
Nevertheless, the attacker is still able to produce major deviations from NVP for valves with an
opening and closing speed diﬀerence. For this reason, a better solution would be to provide a
smaller TS combined with an equal opening and closing speed of valves. As shown by the results,
with a smaller TS, the fuel and feed-water valves experience insigniﬁcant deviations from NVP
with minimum emulated delays and background traﬃc. In contrast, the speed diﬀerence of the
steam valve still causes major deviations from NVP, that are reduced by only extreme network
delays of 3s and a background traﬃc of 10Mbit/s. Lowering the value of the TS below 1ms could
be considered a measure for a more resilient control code. However, this is only possible if the
control code’s execution time is smaller than this value.
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Figure 7: Eﬀect of packet loss and background traﬃc on the steam valve position for 1ms TS
and 0s emulated delay
5.2 The Eﬀect of the Cyber Attack on the Steam Pressure
In the previous sub-section we have shown that the attacker can cause major deviations from the
NVP for all three valves. In this sub-section we analyze the eﬀects that the previously presented
deviations have on the steam pressure. Following the same experimental strategy, we have ﬁrst
recorded the steam pressure for a TS of 100ms followed by a TS of 1ms.
100ms Task Scheduling
The results from Figure 8 show that for an emulated network delay of 0s, the attacker is able
to increase the steam pressure above 250 kg/cm2 after only 2.5 minutes the attack is started.
Moreover, the attacker is able to bring the process into a critical state even for a network delay
of 0.5s. Only extreme network delays of 3s show a major impact and prevent the successful
outcome of the attack, although the attacker is still able to produce major deviations from NVP,
as previously shown in Figure 3. With larger packet losses the process reaches the critical state
after 4 minutes for a 5% loss and 6 minutes for 10% loss, as shown in the same ﬁgure. The
reason for this behavior is that all three valves still experience major deviations from their NVP,
as shown in Figure 4, which causes the pressure to increase immediately after the attack is
started. The background traﬃc aﬀects the outcome of the attack only in extreme cases when it
reaches the maximum network capacity. Otherwise, the attacker is able to open and close the
valves, as shown in Figure 5, and to bring the process into the critical state.
1ms Task Scheduling
By decreasing the TS time to 1ms the attacker is not able to reach his goal in neither of the
settings included in this study (Figure 9). Nevertheless, it is still able to increase the steam
pressure to a maximum value of 234 kg/cm2 for minimal network delay, packet loss and back-
ground traﬃc. The reason behind this is that the attacker is still able to completely close the
steam valve, although it is able to cause only negligible deviations from the NVP for the other
two valves, as shown in Figure 6.
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Figure 8: Eﬀect of network delays, packet loss and background traﬃc on the steam pressure for
100ms TS
Table 1: Average valve positions and maximum pressure (P) during cyber attacks
Fuel valve Steam valve Feed-water valve Max P (kg/cm2)
(Target: 0.34) (Target: 0.68) (Target: 0.43) (Target: 108)
Parameters 100ms 1ms 100ms 1ms 100ms 1ms 100ms 1ms
Delay
(s)
0 0.93 0.34 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.433 585 234
0.5 0.75 0.34 0.11 0.31 0.21 0.433 459 173
3 0.4 0.34 0.25 0.51 0.39 0.433 198 131
Loss 5 0.84 0.34 0.1 0.3 0.14 0.433 407 204
(%) 10 0.61 0.34 0.17 0.46 0.2 0.433 347 145
Traﬃc 5 0.92 0.34 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.433 586 234
(Mbit/s) 10 0.34 0.34 0.55 0.67 0.43 0.433 128 110
By increasing the emulated network delays the maximum pressure induced by the attacker
reduces gradually from 173 kg/cm2 for 0.5s to 131 kg/cm2 for 3s (Table 1). However, larger
packet losses and background traﬃc do not produce major diﬀerences in the outcome of the
attack, unless extreme values are used. Nevertheless, a 5% packet loss is still able to reduce the
maximum pressure to 204 kg/cm2, while a 10% packet loss reduces the maximum pressure to 145
kg/cm2. In the extreme case of 10Mbit/s background traﬃc the maximum pressure is reduced
to 110 kg/cm2.
The results from this section have shown that by decreasing the TS to 1ms the physical process
is able to react more eﬃciently to cyber attacks. Network delays, packet losses and background
traﬃc have also shown to have an inﬂuence on the attack. Nevertheless, by using a TS of 100ms
these are able to aﬀect the outcome of the attack only in extreme cases. Consequently, designers
should consider using a lower TS whenever possible in order to prevent the successful outcome
of similar attacks.
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Figure 9: Eﬀect of network delays, packet loss and background traﬃc on the steam pressure for
1ms TS
6 Conclusion
The study presented in this paper showed that cyber attacks exploiting knowledge on NICS
can use regular Modbus packets to bring the physical process into a critical state. Within this
scenario we evaluated the impact of network and installation-speciﬁc parameters on cyber attacks
targeting a power plant. The experimental results showed that while communications parameters
such as network delays, packet losses and background traﬃc have a limited eﬀect on the attack,
task scheduling and properties of physical processes, i.e. the speed of control valves, can become
eﬀective measures for increasing the resilience of physical processes. The main contribution of
this paper is that it identiﬁes two key parameters that could be adopted at design-time to increase
the resilience of physical processes confronted with cyber attacks. The ﬁrst one, i.e. control code
task scheduling, provides engineers an eﬃcient mechanism to counterbalance disturbances caused
by malicious command packets, while the second one, i.e. the speed of control valves, provides
insight into the way that an attacker might manipulate knowledge on physical properties to bring
the process into a critical state. Such properties should be taken into account at process design
time, which will lead to a more resilient physical process.
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